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1 Introduction
Our purpose is to provide a dynamic auction mechanism that can eciently allocate multi-
ple heterogeneous indivisible goods to many bidders and at the same time induces bidders
to behave truthfully. An important feature of the auction is that it can handle a typical
pattern of complementarity among the goods. Traditionally, research has focused on ex-
amining auctions for selling a single item. However, over the last twenty years auctions
for selling multiple items have become popular and widespread use, see e.g., Klemperer
(2004) and Milgrom (2004) on auctioning spectrum rights. The past study has improved
our understanding of how the design of auction aects its outcome and also how a market
environment inuences its auction design.
In a seminal paper, Ausubel (2006) develops an ingenious dynamic auction mechanism
for selling heterogeneous goods. His auction yields an ecient outcome, induces bidders
to bid sincerely as price-takers, and at the same time protects bidders' private values from
being fully exposed. Therefore this auction not only maintains the important strategy-
proof property of the famous Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism but also overcomes
the informational ineciency problem facing the VCG mechanism.4 More specically,
Ausubel (2006) examines two auction models: In his rst model, the goods are perfectly
divisible and bidders have strictly concave value functions, whereas in his second model, all
goods are indivisible and are viewed as substitutes in the sense that every bidder's demand
for the goods satises the gross substitutes (GS) condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982).5
His analysis concentrates on the rst model and is based on calculus and convex analysis.
This paper aims to show that we can extend and generalize Ausubel's auction from the
setting with substitute goods to a more general and more practical setting that permits
complementarities among goods. More precisely, we examine an auction market where a
seller wishes to sell two disjoint sets S1 and S2 of heterogeneous items to many bidders
and has a reservation value for every bundle of goods. The seller trades her products
in order to maximize revenues. Generally, items in the same set Si are substitutes but
are complementary to items in the other set Sj. This relation is introduced by Sun and
4See Rothkopf, Teisberg, and Kahn (1990), Ausubel (2004, 2006), Perry and Reny (2005), Milgrom
(2007), and Rothkopf (2007) on the merits and demerits of the VCG mechanism in detail.
5In a seminal paper, Kelso and Crawford (1982) examine a job matching model and prove by a salary
adjustment process that there exists an ecient matching between rms and workers which is supported
by a system of competitive salaries, provided that every rm views all workers as substitutes. Gul and
Stacchetti (2000) propose an ascending auction for discovering a Walrasian equilibrium price vector in a
market where all goods for sale are substitutes. Milgrom (2000) introduces an ascending auction for selling
substitute goods and discusses its application to the sale of spectrum licenses in the USA. The crucial
dierence between the rst three processes and Ausubel's is that the latter one is not only ecient but
also strategy-proof.
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Yang (2006) and called gross substitutes and complements (GSC).6 This fundamental
pattern captures many familiar and important situations. For instance, in the view of
manufacturing rms, workers and machines are typically complements, whereas workers
are substitutes and so are machines. In our earlier analysis (Sun and Yang 2009), we
propose a price adjustment process and show that this process always yields a Walrasian
equilibrium if all bidders are assumed to be price-takers. However, the important strategic
and incentive issues have not yet been addressed. In the current model, we assume instead
that every bidder has a private value on each bundle of the goods and may have an incentive
to economize on his private information. So in this setup, bidders are not assumed to behave
naively as price-takers and could strategically exercise their market power. Now the central
issue is how to devise a dynamic auction that can restore an incentive for bidders to act
truthfully as price-takers and at the same time yields an ecient outcome in this complex
environment where items for sale can create synergies.7
Built upon and improving the adjustment process of Sun and Yang (2009), we will
develop a strategy-proof dynamic auction design for the environment described above. The
auction works roughly as follows. Starting from an arbitrary price vector, the auctioneer
calls out the current price vector, bidders submit their demands at these prices, and then
the auctioneer adjusts the prices of over-demanded items in one set S1 (or S2) upwards but
those of under-demanded items in the other set S2 (or S1) downwards. We call this a double-
6Ostrovsky (2008) independently presents an analogous condition for a vertical supply chain model
with contracts where prices of goods are xed and a non-Walrasian equilibrium solution is used. He proves
constructively the existence of stable matching under the condition, which allows complementarity between
upstream and downstream contracts. Hateld and Milgrom (2005) introduce the notion of contracts to
matching models and establish the existence of stable matching for substitutable contracts. Hateld et al.
(2013) examine a trading network which allows cycles. They show the existence of equilibrium under a
variant of GSC condition in the sense that every agent in the network has quasi-linear utility and views
his upstream (downstream) contracts as substitutes but upstream (i.e., buying in) and downstream (i.e.,
selling out) contracts together as complements. Their network is a directed graph in which agents are
nodes and both upstream and downstream contracts are directed edges. Baldwin and Klemperer (2013,
section 6), Sun and Yang (2011), and Teytelboym (2013, Chapter 3; 2014) independently study a related
but dierent type of competitive trading network also permitting cycles and demonstrate the existence of
equilibrium provided that the network does not contain any odd cycle and every agent's demand for his
concerned goods satises the GSC condition. In contrast to Hateld et al.'s network, this latter trading
network is an undirected graph in which each set of goods is a node, and every agent is an undirected
edge. See also Drexl (2013).
7Complementarities or synergies among items are known as a dicult issue in auction design and
equilibrium models and well-documented in Milgrom (2000, 2004), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2003), Porter
et al. (2003), Klemperer (2004), and Maskin (2005) among others. As pointed out by Kelso and Crawford
(1982), complementarity can even cause problems with existence of competitive equilibrium in the presence
of indivisibilities. Nonetheless, GS or GSC guarantees the existence of competitive equilibrium in economies
with indivisibilities.
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track auction because it simultaneously updates prices in two opposite directions (ascending
and descending). We show that this allocation mechanism always induces bidders to bid
sincerely and nds an ecient outcome in nitely many rounds. In particular, this auction
exhibits a signicant strategic property that sincere bidding by every bidder is an ex post
strongly perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game of incomplete information induced by
the auction. More specically, this means that after the auction has run up to any time
t, no matter what has happened up to t and no matter whether it is now on or o an
equilibrium path, sincere bidding is an optimal strategy for every bidder i, as long as from t
on, every his opponent j bids sincerely according to a certain xed GSC utility function ~uj
which need not be his true GSC utility function uj. The notion of ex post strongly perfect
equilibrium is slightly stronger than the concept of ex post perfect equilibrium used in
Ausubel (2004, 2006). In addiction, this new auction guarantees ex post a nonnegative
payo for every bidder no matter how his opponents bid in the auction.
This auction is also detail-free, robust against any regret and independent of the prob-
ability distribution of every bidder's valuations over the goods. Another attractive feature
of this auction is that it is simple, transparent, and privacy-preserving in the sense of Hur-
wicz (1973) and Ausubel (2006); see Kearns et al. (2013) for a recent development on the
last issue. This auction does not only subsume and generalize Ausubel's from the setting
with substitutes to the setting with both substitutes and complements, but also improves
Ausubel's itself.8 Aside from the theoretical interest and general applicability of this dy-
namic auction, our analysis complements Ausubel's which focuses on the model of divisible
goods and relies on calculus and convex analysis. In contrast to Ausubel's analysis, ours is
quite dierent, elementary and intuitive, and can facilitate a better understanding of his
results. Unlike Ausubel (2006), Gul and Stacchetti (2000), Milgrom (2000), Sun and Yang
(2009), the current model permits the seller to have a reservation value for every bundle
of goods and allows her to maximize revenues, and thus makes the model closer to reality.
The proposed auction will also ensure a nonnegative benet of trading for the seller.
The remainder of this paper goes as follows. Section 2 presents the auction model.
Section 3 describes the price adjustment process. Section 4 provides the main results.
Section 5 concludes with some practical applications.
8In each step of Ausubel's auction, the auctioneer needs to compute the smallest or largest solution
of an optimization problem which typically has multiple solutions. We will show that this cumbersome
computation is not needed. This improvement is very useful for practical auction design. See Section 3 in
detail.
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2 The Auction Model
A seller (denoted by 0) wishes to auction a set N = f1; 2;    ; ng of n indivisible items
to a nite group I of bidders. The items may be heterogeneous and can be divided into
two sets S1 and S2 (i.e., N = S1 [ S2 and S1 \ S2 = ;). For example, one can think of
S1 as tables and of S2 as chairs. Items in the same set can be also heterogeneous. Let
I0 = I [ f0g denote the set of all agents (bidders and seller) in the market. Every agent
i 2 I0 has a value function ui : 2N ! IR specifying his/her valuation ui(B) (in units of
money) on each bundle B with ui(;) = 0, where 2N denotes the family of all bundles of
items.9 It is standard to assume that ui is weakly increasing, and that every bidder (he)
can pay up to his value, and every agent has quasi-linear utilities in money. The seller (she)
is a revenue-maximizer while the bidders are prot-maximizers. Here we allow the seller
to have a utility function u0 and so the model can accommodate more practical situations
than the usual situation of assuming u0 to be always zero.10
A price vector p = (p1;    ; pn) 2 IRn indicates a price ph for each item h 2 N . Agent
i's demand correspondence Di(p), the net utility function vi(A; p), and the indirect utility
function V i(p), are dened respectively by
Di(p) = argmaxANfui(A) Ph2A phg;
vi(A; p) = ui(A) Ph2A ph; and
V i(p) = maxANfui(A) Ph2A phg:
(2.1)
Because the seller is a revenue-maximizer, the family of her retaining bundles at prices p
are given by
S(p) = argmax
AN
fu0(A) + X
h2NnA
phg:
We rst have the following basic observation which will be used later. The proof of the
next result, and Lemma 2.3 and Theorem 3.1 will be relegated to the Appendix.
Lemma 2.1 For the seller, it holds that S(p) = D0(p).
An allocation of items in N is a partition  = ((i); i 2 I0) of items among all agents
in I0, i.e., (i) \ (j) = ; for all i 6= j and [i2I0(i) = N . Note that (i) = ; is allowed.
At allocation , agent i receives bundle (i). (0) 6= ; is the bundle of unsold items and
will be retained by the seller. An allocation  is ecient if
P
i2I0 u
i((i))  Pi2I0 ui((i))
for every allocation . Given an ecient allocation , let R(N) =
P
i2I0 u
i((i)). We call
R(N) the market value of the items which is the same for all ecient allocations.
9The seller's value function u0 actually denotes her reservation price function and can be quite general.
10For instance, Gul and Stacchetti (2000), Milgrom (2000), Ausubel (2006), Sun and Yang (2009) assume
that the seller's reservation value is zero.
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LetM denote the market with the set I0 of agents and the set N of items, and for each
bidder i 2 I, let M i denote the market M without bidder i. Let I i = I0 n fig for every
bidder i 2 I, and for convenience also let M 0 =M and I 0 = I0.
Next, we introduce two fundamental solution concepts for this auction model: the
Walraisian equilibrium and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome.
Denition 2.2 A Walrasian equilibrium (p; ) consists of a price vector p 2 IRn+ and an
allocation  such that (i) 2 Di(p) for every bidder i 2 I and (0) 2 S(p) for the seller.
In equilibrium (p; ), the seller retains the bundle (0) of goods and collects the pay-
ment
P
j2I
P
h2(j) ph from her sold goods and thus her equilibrium revenue is u
0((0)) +P
j2I
P
h2(j) ph. Notice that in Gul and Stacchetti (1999, 2000), Milgrom (2000), Ausubel
(2006), Sun and Yang (2006, 2009) it is assumed the seller values every bundle of goods
at zero and consequently in equilibrium all goods will be sold to bidders. In the current
model, because the seller has reservation value for every bundle, we need to slightly modify
the notion of equilibrium. The following lemma shows that the modication is appropriate.
Lemma 2.3 Let (p; ) be a Walrasian equilibrium. Then  is an ecient allocation.
The following denes the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The denition is slightly more
general than its standard one because here we permit the seller to have her own utility
function. The standard one assumes that the seller values everything at zero.
Denition 2.4 The VCG outcome is the outcome of the following procedure: every agent
i 2 I0 reports his/her value function ui. Then the auctioneer computes an ecient alloca-
tion  with respect to all reported ui and assigns bundle (i) to bidder i 2 I and charges
him a payment of qi = u
i((i))   R(N) + R i(N), where R(N) and R i(N) are the
market values of the markets M and M i based on ui (i 2 I0), respectively. Bidder i's
VCG payo equals R(N) R i(N), i 2 I.
To ensure the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium, it will be necessary for us to impose
some conditions. The most important one is known as gross substitutes and complements
condition, which is introduced and used in Sun and Yang (2006, 2009), and dened as
follows.11
Denition 2.5 The value function ui of agent i satises the gross substitutes and com-
plements (GSC) condition if for any price vector p 2 IRn, any item k 2 Sj for j = 1 or 2,
any   0, and any A 2 Di(p), there exists B 2 Di(p+e(k)) such that (A\Sj)nfkg  B
and (Ac \ Scj )  Bc.
11The following piece of notation will be used. For any positive integer k  n, e(k) denotes the kth unit
vector in IRn. Let Zn stand for the integer lattice in IRn and 0 the n-vector of 0's. For any subset A of
N , let e(A) =
P
k2A e(k). When A = fkg, we also write e(A) as e(k). For any subset A of N , let Ac
denote its complement, i.e., Ac = N nA. For any nite set A, jAj denotes the number of elements in A.
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GSC says that agent i views items in each set Sj as substitutes, but items across the two
sets S1 and S2 as complements. In particular, when either S1 = ; or S2 = ;, GSC reduces
to the gross substitutes (GS) condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982). GS requires that all
the items be substitutes, and thus excludes any complementarity among items. The GS
case has been studied extensively in the literature; see e.g., Kelso and Crawford (1982),
Gul and Stacchetti (1999, 2000), Milgrom (2000, 2004), and Ausubel (2006). Milgrom and
Strulovici (2009) examine substitute goods in a more general setting. Sun and Yang (2014)
investigate a related but dierent model in which all items for sale are complementary.12
The following three assumptions will be maintained throughout:
(A1) Integer Private Values for Bidders: Every bidder i's value function ui : 2N ! Z+
takes integer values and is his private information.
(A2) Integer Public Values for Seller: The seller's value function u0 : 2N ! Z+ takes
integer values and is public information, taking the form of u0(S) = u01(S \ S1) +
u02(S \ S2) for any S  N , where u0h : 2Sh ! Z+, h = 1; 2.
(A3) Gross Substitutes and Complements: The value function ui of every agent i 2 I0
satises the GSC condition with respect to the two sets S1 and S2.
In the literature, the value of the seller over each bundle is usually assumed to be zero
and this information is made public. Here A2 is more general and can accommodate more
realistic situations where the seller's reservation value over her goods for sale need not
be zero and may vary from one bundle to another. The seller's utility over goods from
the two sets is separable but the utility over goods from the same set Sh need not be
separable and can be very general. Although the seller has a reservation value function,
she is assumed to reveal this function truthfully. This is a natural assumption from the
well-known impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), saying that it is
impossible to design a trading mechanism even just for one buyer and one seller with one
12The major dierences between Sun and Yang (2014) and the current one are (1) while in the current
model there are two sets of items, items of each set are substitutable and can be heterogeneous but are
complementary to items in the other set, goods in the model of Sun and Yang (2014) are all complementary;
(2) while the current model has a Walrasian equilibrium (Sun and Yang 2006) in which the pricing rule is
anonymous and linear, the model of Sun and Yang (2014) can only guarantee the existence of a nonlinear
pricing Walrasian equilibrium in which the pricing rule is anonymous but nonlinear; (3) while the current
auction is a blend of ascending and descending formats where prices are specied on individual items, the
auction of Sun and Yang (2014) is and must be a package auction in which prices are specied on bundles
of items; (4) there does not exist any transformation between the current model and Sun and Yang (2014)
and in fact the structure of equilibrium price vectors for the two models is inherently dierent; see Sun
and Yang (2009, Theorem 3, p. 937; 2014, Theorem 1, p. 432). These two models describe two typical,
basic, and closely related yet intrinsically dierent economic environments.
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item in such a way that it is optimal for the seller and the buyer to reveal their values
honestly; budgets are balanced; and the nal allocation is ecient. Because of this, in
the literature on auction design it is often implicitly or explicitly assumed that the seller
(or auctioneer) acts honestly, while bidders may behave strategically; see e.g., Gul and
Stacchetti (2000), and Ausubel (2006).
3 The Price Adjustment Process
3.1 An Illustration
It is helpful to use a simple example to illustrate how an ascending (or descending) auction
might be plagued by the exposure problem and how the double-track auction overcomes
the problem to succeed in nding a Walrasian equilibrium. Consider now a market where
a seller wishes to sell two volumes A and B of a book to two buyers. Each buyer knows
his values privately and the seller does not know those values. Buyers' values are given in
the Table 1, and the seller values every bundle at zero. Observe that every buyer views A
and B as complements.
Table 1: Buyers' values over items.
; A B AB
Buyer 1 0 2 2 5
Buyer 2 0 2 2 5
The ascending auction: In an ascending auction, the seller initially announces a low
price vector of p(0) = (pA(0); pB(0)) = (0; 0) so that every buyer demands both A and B.
Buyers respond by reporting their demand sets at p(0): D1(p(0)) = D2(p(0)) = fABg.
According to the reported demand sets, the seller subsequently adjusts the price vector
p(0) to the next one p(1) = p(0) + (0) = (1; 1) by increasing the price of every good by
1, because both goods are over-demanded at p(0). The seller faces a similar situation at
p(1) and p(2). The auction ends up with the price vector p(3) = (3; 3) at which no bidder
wants to demand the items anymore, and thus gets stuck in disequilibrium. We summarize
the entire process in the Table 2. The reader can also verify that starting with a high
price vector p(0) = (pA(0); pB(0)) = (q; q) for any integer q  6 so that no buyer demands
any item, a descending auction will terminate with the price vector p = (2; 2) at which
both buyers demand both items, and thus get stuck in disequilibrium, too. We remind the
reader that prices in auction processes are adjusted in integer or xed quantities, which
are common in practice.
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Table 2: The data created by the ascending auction for the example.
Price vector Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Price variation
p(0) = (0; 0) fABg fABg (0) = (1; 1)
p(1) = (1; 1) fABg fABg (1) = (1; 1)
p(2) = (2; 2) fABg fABg (2) = (1; 1)
p(3) = (3; 3) f;g f;g (3) = (0; 0)
The double-track auction: Unlike the previous two cases, in the current double-track
auction, the seller initially announces a price vector of p(0) = (pA(0); pB(0)) = (0; 6) (a
low price for item A but a high price for item B) so that every buyer demands only item
A and not item B. Buyers respond by reporting their demand sets at p(0): D1(p(0)) =
D2(p(0)) = fAg. Using the reported demands, the seller subsequently adjusts the price
vector p(0) to the next one p(1) = p(0)+ (0) = (1; 5) by increasing the price of A by 1 but
decreasing the price of B by 1, because A is over-demanded but B is under-demanded at
p(0). At p(1), the seller faces a similar situation. An interesting moment occurs when p(1)
advances to p(2) = (2; 4) at which B is clearly still under-demanded, but A can be seen
as either over-demanded or balanced. According to the rule of the double-track auction
to be discussed soon in detail, the seller treats A as balanced and so she adjusts p(2) to
p(3) = (2; 3) by decreasing the price of B by 1 and holding the price of A constant. At p(3),
the market reaches an equilibrium in which the seller can assign items A and B to buyer
1 and asks him to pay 5, while buyer 2 gets nothing and pays nothing. We can summarize
the entire process in the Table 3. Observe that in this process, the seller increases the
price of item A (since it is over-demanded) but decreases the price of item B (since it is
under-demanded) until the market is clear.
Table 3: The data created by the double-track auction for the example.
Price vector Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Price variation
p(0) = (0; 6) fAg fAg (0) = (1; 1)
p(1) = (1; 5) fAg fAg (1) = (1; 1)
p(2) = (2; 4) f;; Ag f;; Ag (2) = (0; 1)
p(3) = (2; 3) f;; A;ABg f;; A;ABg (3) = (0; 0)
3.2 The Formal Price Adjustment Process
In this subsection we give a detailed description of the double-track auction. In a dynamic
auction, at each time t 2 Z+ and with respect to a price vector p(t) 2 IRn, each bidder i
selects a bid Ci(t), a subset of 2N . We say that bidder i bids sincerely relative to value
function ui if his bid always equals his true demand correspondence, i.e., Ci(t) = Di(p(t)) =
argmaxANfui(A) Ph2A ph(t)g.
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In this section we assume that bidders are price-takers and thus bid sincerely. We will
present a modied version of the double-track adjustment process introduced by Sun and
Yang (2009). This process always yields an equilibrium and provides a key ingredient for the
auction design in Section 4 where bidders i 2 I are not assumed to behave as price-takers
and thus may act strategically. Throughout the paper, in the price adjustment process and
in the auction mechanism, at the beginning the seller reports her reserve price function
u0 to the auctioneer who then uses u0 to calculate the seller's demand correspondence
D0(p(t)) at prices p(t) in every round t. Thus, the auctioneer (she) acts as a proxy bidder
for the seller. Recall that since by Lemma 2.1, D0(p(t)) = S(p(t)), the seller can act as a
bidder. In the sequel, the seller may be also called a bidder. Nevertheless, remember that
this proxy bidder always acts sincerely.
The price adjustment process makes use of the Lyapunov function L : IRn ! IR dened
as
L(p) = X
h2N
ph +
X
i2I0
V i(p) (3.2)
where V i is the indirect utility function of agent i 2 I0. Although the use of Lyapunov
function is well-known in the literature on economies with divisible goods (see Arrow and
Hahn (1971), and Varian (1981)), it was only recently explored by Ausubel (2005, 2006) in
a striking manner to deal with discrete economies with substitutes and extended by Sun
and Yang (2009) to the case including both substitutes and complements. Observe that
the Lyapunov function introduced above includes also the seller's indirect utility function
V 0 and is more general than those previously used in the literature.
By Sun and Yang (2009, Lemma 1 and Theorem 3), the Lyapunov function L dened
above is a convex function and has its minimizers, which correspond to equilibrium price
vectors under certain mild conditions, which are satised by (A3). The double-track auc-
tion explores this link to discover an equilibrium price vector. To use this idea, we need to
clear two major hurdles: one is how to connect observable information such as prices and
demands with the unobservable Lyapunov function L, and the other is how to resolve the
exposure problem. As shown in the previous subsection, while neither an ascending nor
descending auction mechanism will work, the double-track auction does work in this case.
To describe the double-track auction, we introduce the following n-dimensional cube
for price adjustment
 = f 2 IRn j 0  k  1;8k 2 S1;  1  l  0;8l 2 S2 g:
Let  =  \ Zn be the discrete set and  =  ,  =  . Through  (), we lower
prices of items in S2 but raise prices of items in S1, while through 
 (), we lower prices
of items in S1 but raise prices of items in S2. The auction works as follows: Given an
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integer price vector p(t) 2 Zn at time t 2 Z+, the auctioneer asks every bidder i to report
his demand Di(p(t)). Then she uses every bidder's reported demand Di(p(t)) to search for
a price adjustment  2  so as to reduce the value of the Lyapunov function L(p(t)+ ) as
much as possible, in the hope that the minimum of the Lyapunov function will be reached.
Formally, this amounts to solving the continuous maximization problem with the unknown
objective function L
max
2
fL(p(t))  L(p(t) + )g (3.3)
Sun and Yang (2009, pp. 940-942) derive the following crucial relationship in detail:13
max
2
fL(p(t))  L(p(t) + )g = max
2
nX
i2I0

min
S2Di(p(t))
X
h2S
h

  X
h2N
h
o
(3.4)
Observe that the left hand continuous maximization problem over the entire cube  reduces
to the right hand discrete maximization problem over a nite set  of integer price vectors,
and that the relation shows a dramatic change from the unobservable Lyapunov function L
to the observable reported demands of bidders and integer price adjustment . In the right
hand formula, the price of each item in S1 increases either one unit or nothing, whereas
the price of each item in S2 decreases either one unit or nothing. Furthermore, the right
hand max-min formula has an intuitive and meaningful economic interpretation: when the
auctioneer adjusts the prices from p(t) to p(t + 1) = p(t) + (t), she acts in an elaborate
manner so that the seller can extract a maximal gain whereas every bidder can achieve a
minimal loss in indirect utility. Observe that the auctioneer is responsible for executing
the computation of (3.4) based on bidders' reported demands Di(p(t)). It is fairly easy to
calculate the value (minS2Di(p(t))
P
h2S h) for each given  2  or  and bidder i. We
can now present the detailed steps of the adjustment process as follows:
The improved double-track (IDT) adjustment process
Step 1: The seller reports her reserve price function u0 to the auctioneer, who an-
nounces the initial price vector p(0) 2 Zn+. Let t := 0 and go to Step 2.
Step 2: The auctioneer asks every bidder i 2 I0 (this also includes the proxy bidder
0) to report his demand Di(p(t)) at p(t). Then based on reported demands Di(p(t)),
the auctioneer computes a solution (t) to the problem (3.4). If (t) = 0, go to Step
3. Otherwise, set the next price vector p(t+ 1) := p(t) + (t) and t := t+ 1. Return
to Step 2.
13A brief self-contained explanation is given in the appendix.
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Step 3: The auctioneer asks every bidder i 2 I0 to report his demand Di(p(t)) at
p(t). Then based on reported demands Di(p(t)), the auctioneer computes a solution
(t) to the problem (3.4) where  is replaced by . If (t) = 0, then the auction
stops. Otherwise, set the next price vector p(t + 1) := p(t) + (t) and t := t + 1.
Return to Step 3.
Observe that in both Step 2 and Step 3 the auctioneer needs only an arbitrary solution to
the problem (3.4) with respect to  or . This improves considerably the original process
of Sun and Yang (2009) which requires to take the smallest or largest solution to the same
problem if there are several solutions. (In fact, the set of solutions to the problem (3.4) is
a nonempty lattice and typically has multiple solutions.) This improvement is very useful
and important for practical auction design and makes the implementation easy and fast.
Consequently, it also improves the auction of Ausubel (2006). Recall that in his auction
model with indivisible goods, all goods are assumed to be substitutes, i.e., S1 = ; or S2 = ;
in the current model. In each step of his auction, the auctioneer must compute the smallest
or largest solution of an optimization problem which typically has multiple solutions. The
above process shows that this cumbersome computation is no longer needed. Observe that
the IDT process may go to Step 3 from Step 2 but will never return to Step 2 from Step
3. This is another attractive property and means that we can improve Ausubel's (2006)
global auction which requires repeated implementation of his ascending auction and his
descending auction one after another. Now that requirement can be dropped. His global
auction just needs to execute his ascending auction and descending auction each at most
once.
The following theorem shows the global convergence of the IDT adjustment process.
Theorem 3.1 For the market model under Assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3), starting
with any integer price vector, the IDT adjustment process converges to an equilibrium price
vector in a nite number of rounds.
4 The Strategy-Proof Dynamic Auction Mechanism
In the previous section we have assumed that every bidder acts honestly as a price-taker.
In this section we totally drop that assumption by allowing bidders i 2 I to strategically
exercise their market power. In this environment, we need to address two basic questions.
First, is it possible to design an auction mechanism that induces bidders to act honestly
as price-takers? Second, is it possible to devise an auction that requires just enough
but not excessive information from bidders so that bidders' privacy can be preserved?
To answer these questions in the armative, we propose a dynamic auction that not
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only possesses the appealing strategy-proof property but also has the merit of privacy-
preservation, transparency and detail-freeness.
4.1 The Auction Mechanism Design
We now present the dynamic auction mechanism. The mechanism runs the IDT adjustment
process for all marketsM m (m 2 I0) simultaneously in parallel and in coordination. The
IDT adjustment process works for every marketM m exactly as described in Section 3 but
needs the following modications: Consider any marketM m. At t 2 Z+ and p m(t) 2 Zn+,
every bidder i 2 I m reports a bid Ci m(t)  2N (which need not be his demand set
Di(p m(t))14) and the problem (3.4) becomes the next one for  or  respectively,
max
2( or)
n X
i2I m

min
S2Ci m(t)
X
h2S
h

  X
h2N
h
o
(4.5)
If the auctioneer nds a solution  m(t) of (4.5) for  (), she obtains the next price
vector p m(t + 1) = p m(t) +  m(t) whenever  m(t) 6= 0. We say the IDT adjustment
process nds an allocation  m in M m if  m(t) = 0 for  (i.e., in Step 3 of the
auction) and  m(i) 2 C i m(t) for all i 2 I m. The IDT adjustment process needs to go
back to Step 2 from Step 3 if  m(t) = 0 for  but it nds no allocation  m in M m
such that  m(i) 2 Ci m(t) for all i 2 I m|this modication is meant to tolerate minor
mistakes or manipulations committed by bidders. The IDT adjustment process detects
serious manipulation if it never nds an allocation in M m in which case the auction is
said to stop at time 1. Now we have
The strategy-proof double-track (SPDT) auction
Step 1: Run the IDT adjustment process simultaneously in parallel for every market
M m (m 2 I0) by starting with a common initial price vector p m(0) = p(0) 2 Zn+.
At t 2 Z+ and p m(t) 2 Zn, every bidder i 2 I m n f0g = I n fmg reports a bid
C i m(t)  2N , the proxy bidder 0 bids truthfully by reporting C0 m(t) = D0(p m(t)),
and the auctioneer nds the next price vector p m(t + 1) = p m(t) +  m(t). If the
IDT adjustment process detects serious manipulations in any market, go to Step 3.
Otherwise, the IDT adjustment process continues until it nds an allocation  m in
every market M m (m 2 I0) at p m(T m) 2 Zn+, and T m 2 Z+. Go to Step 2.
Step 2: In this case all markets are clear. For every m 2 I0, every agent i 2 I m and
every t = 0; 1;    ; T m   1, let  mi (t) denote the \indirect utility change" of agent
14However, the proxy bidder 0 (the seller) always bids honestly by reporting her demand set C0 m(t) =
D0(p m(t)).
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i in I m when prices move from p m(t) to p m(t+ 1), where
 mi (t) = min
S2Ci m(t)
X
h2S
 mh (t) (4.6)
Every bidder i 2 I will be assigned the bundle  0(i) of the allocation  0 found in
the market M 0 = M and required to pay qi, with the option to decline when his
payo becomes negative, where
qi =
X
j2I i
T 0 1X
t=0
 0j (t) 
T i 1X
t=0
 ij (t)

+
X
h2N
p ih (T
 i) 
X
h2Nn 0(i)
p 0h (T
 0) (4.7)
The auction stops.
Step 3: In this case every bidder i 2 I receives no item and pays nothing. The
auction stops.
The payment qi of bidder i 2 I has an intuitive interpretation: qi is equal to the
accumulation of \indirect utility changes" of his opponents l 2 I i (also including the proxy
bidder 0) along the path from p i(T i) to p(0) (in the marketM i) and the path from p(0)
to p 0(T 0) (in the marketM ) by subtracting Ph2Nn 0(i) p 0h {the equilibrium payments
by bidder i's opponents in the market M, and adding Ph2N p ih (T i){the equilibrium
payments by bidder i's opponents in the market M i. Notice that Ausubel's auction
(2006) and his payment rule are not symmetric, whereas the current auction and payment
rule are symmetric and simpler.15
Notice that the option of rejection in Step 2 is a new auction rule in contrast to Ausubel
(2004, 2006) which do not have such rules. This rule means that if the assignment of bidder
i gives him a negative payo ui( 0(i))   qi < 0, he can reject the assignment and leave
the auction empty handed without any cost. In Step 3, in contrast to Ausubel's penalty
of innity, we adopt the lenient policy of no punishment, which is common in practice.
This is possible because we use the convention that if honesty for an agent is one of his
optimal policies, he will only adopt the honesty policy. Finally, it is simple but important
to observe that the SPDT auction tolerates any mistakes or manipulations committed by
bidders and allows them to correct so that for any time t 2 Z+, no matter what has
15More precisely, the current auction starts with the same initial price vector p(0) for all marketsM and
M i, i 2 I, whereas Ausubel's (Ausubel 2006, pp.615-616) starts with the same initial price vector p(0)
only for the marketsM i, i 2 I, but for the marketM his auction starts with the equilibrium price vector
p k

of any chosen market M k . In Ausubel's auction, the payment of bidder k is given by Equation
(7) (Ausubel 2006, p.611) using the price vectors along the path from p k

to p. The VCG payment of
bidder i (i 2 I k) is also given by Equation (7) but using the price vectors along the path from p i to
p0; the path from p0 to p k

; and the path from p k

to p.
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happened before t, as long as from t on every bidder i bids according to his GSC value
function ui, the auction will nd a Walrasian equilibrium in every market in nitely many
rounds and thus terminates in Step 2, because the IDT adjustment process converges to a
Walrasian equilibrium from any integer price vector.
4.2 Incentive and Strategic Issues
To study the incentive and strategic properties of the SPDT auction mechanism, we will
formulate this auction as an extensive-form dynamic game of incomplete information in
which bidders are players. Prior to the start of the (auction) game, nature reveals to
every player i 2 I only his own value function ui 2 U of private information and a joint
probability distribution F () from which the prole fuigi2I is drawn, where U denotes the
family of all value functions u : 2N ! Z+ satisfying Assumptions (A1) and (A2). Let H ti
be the part of the information (or history) of play that player i has observed just before
he submits his choice sets at time t 2 Z+. A natural and sensible specication is that H ti
comprises the complete set of all observable price vectors and all players' choice sets, i.e.,
H ti = fp m(t); p m(s); Cj m(s) j m 2 I0; j 2 I; 0  s < t;m 6= jg
Note that H ti = H
t
j for all i; j 2 I, namely, all bidders share a common history just like in
an English auction. Let T  be the time when the SPDT auction stops at Steps 2 or 3. If the
auction has found an allocation in any M m, for consistency and convenience, we dene
Ci m(t) = C
i
 m(T
 m) and p m(t) = p m(T m) for any i 2 I m and any t 2 Z+ between
T m and T . After any history H ti and at any time t 2 Z+, each player i updates his
posterior beliefs i( j t;H ti ; ui) over opponents' value functions; see also Ausubel (2006).
We stress that even after the auction is nished, player i may not know his opponents'
value functions precisely.
A (dynamic) strategy i of player i(i 2 I) is a set-valued function f(t;m;H ti ; ui) j t 2
Z+;m 2 I i; ui 2 Ug ! 2N , which tells him to bid i(t;m;H ti ; ui)  2N for every market
M m(m 2 I i) at each time t 2 Z+ when he observes H ti . Let i denote player i0s strategy
space of all such strategies i. We say that i is a regular bidding strategy for player i if
irrespective of his true utility function ui, he always reports his choice set Ci m(t) according
to some utility function ~ui 2 U for any m 2 I i, t 2 Z+, p m(t) 2 Zn, and H ti , i.e.,
i(t;m;H
t
i ; u
i) = C i m(t) = argmax
AN
f~ui(A)  X
h2A
p mh (t)g
Note that ~ui may or may not be his true utility function ui. We denote such a regular
bidding strategy by ~u
i
i . Thus, every GSC utility function ~u(~u 2 U) determines a regular
bidding strategy for each player. For simplicity, we also use U to denote the family of all
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such strategies. Clearly, U  i. A regular bidding strategy ~uii is sincere bidding (strategy)
for player i if ~ui is equal to his true utility function ui, namely, if he always reports his
demand set Di(p m(t)) as dened by (2.1) with respect to his true utility function ui,
i.e., i(t;m;H
t
i ; u
i) = Ci m(t) = D
i(p m(t)) = argmaxANfui(A)  Ph2A p mh (t)g for all
t 2 Z+, m 2 I i and p m(t) 2 Zn. The strategy space i of player i contains regular
bidding strategies, sincere bidding strategies and also various other strategies.
Given the auction rules, the outcome of this auction game depends entirely upon the
realization of utility functions and the strategies the bidders take. When every bidder i 2 I
takes a strategy i and the SPDT auction terminates in Step 2, then bidder i 2 I receives
bundle  0(i) and pays qi given by (4:7), or gets nothing and pays nothing. When every
bidder i 2 I takes a strategy i and the SPDT auction stops in Step 3, every bidder gets
nothing and pays nothing. In summary, every player i0s payo function Wi(; ) is given by
Wi

fjgj2I ; fujgj2I

=
(
maxf0; ui( 0(i))  qig if the auction stops in Step 2,
0 if the auction stops in Step 3.
We now recall the notion of ex post perfect equilibrium used by Ausubel (2004, 2006) to
dynamic auction games of incomplete information. For such a game, the ](I)-tuple figi2I
is said to be an ex post perfect equilibrium16 if for any time t 2 Z+, any history prole
fH tigi2I , and any realization fuigi2I of prole of utility functions of private information, the
continuation strategy i( j t;H ti ; ui) of every player i 2 I (i.e., i(s;m;Hsi j t;H ti ; ui)  2N
for all s  t, m 2 I i and Hsi ) constitutes his best response against the continuation
strategies fj( j t;H tj ; uj)gj2I i of player i's opponents of the game even if the realization
fuigi2I becomes common knowledge.
For the current model, we introduce and use the following stronger equilibrium solution
than the previous one. A strategy i of player i constitutes an ex post strongly perfect
strategy for him if for any time t 2 Z+, any history prole fH tjgj2I , and any realization
fujgj2I of prole of utility functions of private information, the continuation strategy
i( j t;H ti ; ui) of player i is his best response against all continuation regular bidding
strategies f~ujj ( j t;H tj ; uj)gj2I i of player i's opponents, even if the realization fuigi2I
becomes common knowledge. The ](I)-tuple figi2I of regular bidding strategies comprises
an ex post strongly perfect (Nash) equilibrium if for every player i 2 I, his regular bidding
strategy i is an ex post strongly perfect strategy. Clearly, every ex post strongly perfect
equilibrium is an ex post perfect equilibrium but the reverse may not be true. Stronger than
Bayesian equilibrium or perfect Bayesian equilibrium, ex post (strongly) perfect equilibria
have a number of additional desirable properties, i.e., they are not only robust against any
regret but also independent of any probability distribution. Furthermore, in the complete
16In (static or sealed-bid) auction games of incomplete information, the ex post equilibrium is used by
Cremer and McLean (1985) and Krishna (2002).
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information case, ex post perfect equilibrium simply coincides with the familiar notion of
subgame perfect equilibrium.
In the current auction game, although the auctioneer knows that every bidder i 2 I
possesses a GSC utility function ui, she has no precise knowledge of ui. This implies that
as long as a bidder reports his demand according to some xed GSC utility function ~ui
not necessarily being his true utility function, it is extremely hard if not impossible to
prove whether he bids truthfully or not. According to Hurwicz (1973, p.23) on mechanism
design, \it is conceivable that the participants would cheat without openly violating the
rules." This is why we focus on \all regular bidding strategies" instead of \all dynamic
strategies" of all opponents of every bidder i 2 I in the denition of the proposed solution.
Regular bidding strategies are safe, whereas irregular ones are unsafe in the sense that they
have a high probability of being detected for open violation of the auction rules.
Finally, we introduce one more desirable property, which we believe is also important
for any practical auction design. An auction mechanism is said to be ex post individually
rational, if, for every bidder, no matter how his opponents bid in the auction, as long as
he is suciently rational in the sense that he can judge whether his payo is negative
or nonnegative, he will never end up with a negative payo. It will be shown that the
proposed auction also possesses this appealing property. It might be worth mentioning
that Ausubel's auction (2006) does not have this property.
Now we are prepared to establish our major theorem.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that the market M satises Assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3).
(i) When every bidder bids sincerely, the SPDT auction converges to a Walrasian equi-
librium, yields a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves outcome for the market M in a nite number of
rounds, and the seller receives a nonnegative benet of trading.
(ii) Sincere bidding by every bidder is an ex post strongly perfect equilibrium in the SPDT
auction.
(iii) The SPDT auction is ex post individually rational.
Proof: We rst prove (i). By the argument in Section 3, we see that when every bidder
i bids sincerely according to his true GSC function ui , the auction terminates at Step 2
and nds a Walrasian equilibrium (p m(T m);  m) in every market M m, m 2 I0. By
the rules, every bidder i receives bundle  0(i) and pays qi of (4.7). It follows from (5.9)
in the Appendix that
 mi (t) = min
S2Ci m(t)
X
h2S
 mh (t) = V
i(p m(t))  V i(p m(t+ 1))
for all i 2 I and m 2 I0 (i 6= m), where Ci m(t) = Di(p m(t)). Using these equations, we
will show that qi coincides with the VCG payment q

i = u
i( 0(i))   R(N) + R i(N),
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where R(N) =
P
j2I uj( 0(j)) and R i(N) =
P
j2I i u
j( i(j)): Observe that payment
qi of (4.7) satises
qi =
P
j2I i
PT 0 1
t=0 (V
j(p 0(t))  V j(p 0(t+ 1)))
 PT i 1t=0 (V j(p i(t))  V j(p i(t+ 1)))
+
P
h2N p
 i
h (T
 i) Ph2Nn 0(i) p 0h (T 0)
=
P
j2I i

(V j(p 0(0))  V j(p 0(T 0)))  (V j(p i(0))  V j(p i(T 0)))

+
P
h2N p
 i
h (T
 i) Ph2Nn 0(i) p 0h (T 0)
=
P
j2I i V
j(p i(T 0)) +
P
h2N p
 i
h (T
 i)

 
P
j2I i V
j(p 0(T 0)) +
P
h2Nn 0(i) p
 0
h (T
 0)

=
P
j2I i u
j( i(j)) Pj2I i uj( 0(j))
= ui( 0(i)) R(N) +R i(N)
= qi :
Bidder i0s payo ui( 0(i))  qi equals his VCG payo R(N) R i(N).
We next prove that the seller receives a nonnegative benet. First note that for every
buyer i 2 I, it satises that
R i(N)  u0( 0(0) [  0(i)) +
X
j2Infig
uj( 0(j)):
Thus, for the nal payo ~W0 of the seller, we have
~W0 = u
0( 0(0)) +
P
i2I qi
= u0( 0(0)) +
P
i2I

ui( 0(i)) R(N) +R i(N)

=
P
i2I R i(N)  (m  1)R(N)
 Pi2Iu0( 0(0) [  0(i)) +Pj2Infig uj( 0(j))  (m  1)R(N)
=
P
i2I

[u0( 0(0) [  0(i))  u0( 0(0)] +R(N)  ui( 0(i))

  (m  1)R(N)
= u0( 0(0)) +
P
i2I [u0( 0(0) [  0(i))  u0( 0(0)]
=
P
i2I u0( 0(0) [  0(i))  (m  1)u0( 0(0):
By Assumptions (A2) and (A3) on the seller's utility function u0, for every k = 1; 2;    ;m 
1, we have
u0([ki=0 0(i)) + u0( 0(0) [  0(k + 1))  u0([k+1i=0  0(i)) + u0( 0(0):
Thus, we can iteratively show that
~W0 =
P
i2I u0( 0(0) [  0(i))  (m  1)u0( 0(0)
 u0([mi=0 0(i)) = u0(N):
Consequently, the seller's benet ~W0   u0(N) is nonnegative.
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Now we prove (ii). It suces to show that sincere bidding is every player i0s ex post
strongly perfect strategy. Consider any time t 2 Z+, any history prole fH tj gj2I (which
may be on or o the equilibrium path), and any realization fujgj2I of prole of utility
functions in U I of private information.17 Suppose that from this time t on every opponent
j(j 2 I i) will report his bids according to a regular bidding strategy ~ujj . That is, every
player j(j 2 I i) according to some ~uj 2 U reports his Cj m(t) at every round t(t  t),
namely,
~u
j
j (t;m;H
t
j ; u
j) = Cj m(t) = argmax
AN
f~uj(A)  X
h2A
p mh (t)g
for every m 2 I j. Of course, it is possible that ~uj 6= uj. Clearly, in this continuation game
from time t, when all opponents of player i choose regular bidding strategies, because of
the option rule of rejection in Step 2, bidder i prefers a strategy which results in the auction
terminating at Step 2 and a nonnegative payo, to any other strategies which result in the
auction stopping at Step 3 and a zero payo. Therefore, it sucient to compare the sincere
bidding strategy with any other strategies which also result in the auction nishing at Step
2. Suppose that 0i( j t; H ti ; ui) (0i in short) is such a continuation strategy of player
i resulting in an allocation  for M, and that bidder i's (continuation) sincere bidding
strategy results in an allocation  for M. Without any loss of generality, we assume that
by the time t, the auction for the marketsM andM i has not yet nished, i.e., t < T 0
and t < T i. When player i chooses the strategy 0i, his payment q
0
i given by (4.7) is
q0i =
P
j2I i
Pt 1
t=0 
 0
j (t) +
PT 0 1
t=t [
~V j(p 0(t))  ~V j(p 0(t+ 1))]
 Pt 1t=0  ij (t) PT i 1t=t [ ~V j(p i(t))  ~V j(p i(t+ 1))]
+
P
h2N p
 i
h (T
 i) Ph2Nn(i) p 0h (T 0)
=
P
j2I i
Pt 1
t=0 [
 0
j (t)  ij (t)] + ~V j(p 0(t)) + ~V j(p i(T i))  ~V j(p i(t))

+
P
h2N p
 i
h (T
 i)
 
P
j2I i ~V
j(p 0(T 0)) +
P
h2Nn(i) p
 0
h (T
 0)

= constant Pj2I i ~uj((j));
where ~V j is bidder j's indirect utility function based on ~uj and constant is given by
constant =
P
j2I i
Pt 1
t=0 [
 0
j (t)  ij (t)]

+
P
j2I i

~V j(p 0(t)) + ~V j(p i(T i))  ~V j(p i(t))

+
P
h2N p
 i
h (T
 i)
Observe that constant is totally determined by the history prole fH tj gj2I and the market
M i without bidder i, and does not depend on player i's strategy 0i, (and that  0j (t) and
 ij (t) for t < t
 cannot be expressed by ~V j, because player j may not have bid according
17In this case, the outcome of the game depends on the histories Ht

j and the strategies that all bidders
will take in the continuation game starting from t. Bidders cannot change histories but can inuence the
path of the future from t on.
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to ~uj before t). Analogously we can show that when bidder i uses the (continuation)
sincere bidding strategy, his payment ~qi will be ~qi = constant  Pj2I i ~uj((j)); where
constant is the same as the previous one. Furthermore, we know from the argument in
Section 3 that (in the continuation game) when bidder i bids sincerely according to his
utility function ui and every his opponent j(j 2 I i) bids according to a regular bidding
strategy ~u
j
j (i.e., according to a GSC utility function ~u
j 2 U), the resulted allocation 
must be ecient for M w.r.t. ui and ~uj; j 2 I i. This implies that
ui((i)) +
X
j2I i
~uj((j))  ui((i)) + X
j2I i
~uj((j)):
Thus, for bidder i0s payoWi of the assignment resulting from the sincere bidding strategy
and his payo W 0i of the assignment resulting from the strategy 
0
i, we have
Wi = u
i((i))  ~qi = ui((i))  (constant Pj2I i ~uj((j)))
= ui((i)) +
P
j2I i ~u
j((j))  constant
 ui((i)) +Pj2I i ~uj((j))  constant = ui((i))  q0i
= W 0i :
Consequently, for bidder i0s nal payo ~Wi with the sincere bidding strategy and his nal
payo ~W 0i with the strategy 
0
i, we have
~Wi = maxfWi; 0g  maxfW 0i ; 0g = ~W 0i :
Therefore, every player's sincere bidding strategy is his ex post strongly perfect strategy,
so sincere bidding by every bidder is an ex post strongly perfect equilibrium.
Finally, we prove (iii). Since for every bidder there is the option of rejection in Step 2
and no punishment in Step 3, his nal payo cannot be negative if he is suciently rational,
not necessarily optimizing his actions. Clearly, the SPDT auction is ex post individually
rational. 2
Observe that Ausubel's analysis (2006) on his auction's strategic property focuses on
economies with divisible goods and relies on calculus and Theorem 1 of Krishna and Maen-
ner (2001), whereas the current analysis is quite dierent, elementary and intuitive.
5 Applications
In many practical economic environments, substitutes and complements are jointly ob-
served. We name, but a few of basic instances, tables and chairs, left and right shoes, keys
and lockers, software and hardware packages, landing and taking-o slots, machines and
workers. The GSC condition captures the key feature of such environments. That is, there
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are two dierent kinds of goods in which goods of the same kind are substitutes and can
be heterogeneous but are complementary to goods of the other kind. The GSC condition
is dened with respect to two disjoint sets S1 and S2. When one of the two sets is empty,
the GSC condition coincides with the famous GS condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982).
Either of the two conditions ensures the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium. It is also
known from e.g., Sun and Yang (2014, Example 1, p. 429) that if the GSC condition applies
to three or more dierent kinds of goods in which goods of the same kind are substitutes
but complementary to goods of any other kind, the existence of a Walarasian equilibrium
is not guaranteed anymore. A major open question here is whether the GSC condition
dened for three or more dierent kinds of goods guarantees the existence of a nonlinear
pricing Walrasian equilibrium or not.
In the following we discuss two practical and common situations in which the GSC
condition is naturally satised. The double-track auction can be easily applied to these
environments, while neither an ascending nor descending auction can work, as the simple
example in Section 3.1 indicates.
Example 1: Many goods are made up of two basic components. For example, the Bible
consists of Old Testament and New Testament. Let S1 denote the set of identical items of
component 1, and S2 the set of identical items of component 2. Identical items are labeled
dierently. The set N stands for the set of all items, i.e., N = S1 [ S2. Here goods from
each component Sh, h = 1; 2, may be called intermediate goods, and a pair of one item
from each component Sh, h = 1; 2, forms a unit of the nal good. Consider now a market
in which a seller wishes to sell all goods in N to a group I of buyers. To each buyer i 2 I,
units of each intermediate good (and the nal good) are perfect substitutes and can be
represented by a weakly increasing and concave function f ih : IR+ ! IR+ with f ih(0) = 0,
where h = 1; 2 indicate for the intermediate goods and h = 0 stands for the nal good.
When facing up a set A of goods, each buyer i 2 I has to pick up best choices among all
possible combinations, which determine agent i0s value function ui : 2N ! IR by
ui(A) = max
k2fj2Z+ j jminfk1;k2gg

f i0(k) + f
i
1(k1   k) + f i2(k2   k)

where k1 = jA \ S1j and k2 = jA \ S2j.
Given such a market, it is natural and important to ask (i) whether there exists any
competitive equilibrium, and (ii) in the yes case, which items should be assigned to whom
at what prices. We will prove that every agent i's utility function ui satises the GSC
condition, and thus the market has a competitive equilibrium. It is then clear that the
double-track auction automatically answers the second question.
Theorem 5.1 In the market, the value function ui 2 I as dened above satises the gross
substitutes and complements (GSC) condition. The market has at least one competitive
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equilibrium.
Proof: In the proof, we ignore the index i of each agent i 2 I. Take any price vector
p 2 IRn, any A 2 D(p), any item i 2 S1 (or S2), and any   0. Dene D^(p + e(i)) =
D(p+e(i))\fB  N j (A\S1)nfig  Bg. To show that u satises the GSC condition,
we just need to prove that there exists a set B 2 D^(p+ e(i)) such that B \ S2  A.
Let ak = f0(k)   f0(k   1), bk = f1(k)   f1(k   1), and ck = f2(k)   f2(k   1) for all
k = 1; 2;   . It follows that ak  ak+1, bk  bk+1, and ck  ck+1 for all k = 1; 2;   . For
convenience, we also set a0 = b0 = c0 = 0. Suppose that u(A) = f0(r) + f1(s) + f2(t),
where r; s and t are all non-negative integers satisfying r+s = jA\S1j and r+ t = jA\S2j.
Then for every i 2 A \ S1, j 2 A \ S2, i0 2 S1 n A (if 6= ;), and j0 2 S2 n A (if 6= ;),
we have the following observations from the function u and the demand set D(p) that
(1) pi  pi0 , pj  pj0 , bs+1  pi0 , ct+1  pj0 , and ar+1  pi0 + pj0 ;
(2) if s  1, then bs  maxfpi; ar+1   pj0g;
(3) if t  1, then ct  maxfpj; ar+1   pi0g;
(4) if r  1, then ar  maxfpi + pj; ct+1 + pi; bs+1 + pjg.
We rst prove that D^(p+ e(i)) 6= ;. For this purpose, it is sucient to show that there
exists B 2 D(p + e(i)) such that jB \ S1j  jA \ S1j   1, because all items in S1 are
identical and pi  pi0 for all i 2 A \ S1 and i0 2 S1 n A. Suppose to the contrary that
D^(p + e(i)) = ;, i.e., jB \ S1j < jA \ S1j   1 for every B 2 D(p + e(i)). Pick up any
B 2 D(p+ e(i)) satisfying jB \ S1j  j B \ S1j < jA \ S1j   1 for all B 2 D(p+ e(i)).
Then, there must be some item i 2 (A \ S1) n fig such that i =2 B. Suppose that
u( B) = f0(k) + f1(k1) + f2(k2), where k; k1 and k2 are all nonnegative integers satisfying
k + k1 = j B \ S1j < r + s   1 and k + k2 = j B \ S2j. Then, we have pi > bk1+1, or else
B [ fig 2 D(p + e(i)). It follows from bk1+1 < pi  bs that k1  s. Thus, it is only
possible that k < r   1. However, we can show that A \ S2  B and so k2 > t + 1. This
is because if not, take any j 2 (A \ S2) n B 6= ;, then ak+1  ar  pi + pj. And so,
B [ fi; ig 2 D(p + e(i)), yielding a contradiction. Moreover, it follows from property
(4) that ak+1  ar  ct+1   pi  ck2   pi. This implies B [ fig 2 D(p + e(i)), leading
to a contradiction. Consequently, D^(p+ e(i)) 6= ;.
It remains to prove that there exists some B 2 D^(p+ e(i)) such that B \ S2  A. It
suces to show that there exists B 2 D^(p+e(i)) satisfying jB\S2j  jA\S2j, because all
items in S2 are homogeneous and pj  pj0 for all j 2 A\S2 and j0 2 S2nA. Notice that if
there is B 2 D(p+e(i)) with i 2 B, then A 2 D^(p+e(i)) and A\S2  A, and so the
proof is nished. We assume now that there is not B 2 D(p+ e(i)) so that i 2 B. Pick
22
up any B 2 D^(p+e(i)) satisfying i =2 B and j B\S2j  jB\S2j for all B 2 D^(p+e(i)).
We will show j B\S2j  jA\S2j. Assume by way of contradiction that j B\S2j > jA\S2j,
and pick up any j0 2 ( B\S2)nA. Suppose that u( B) = f0(k)+f1(k1)+f2(k2), where k; k1
and k2 are all nonnegative integers satisfying k+k1 = j B\S1j and k+k2 = j B\S2j > r+t.
If k2 > t, then ck2  ct+1  pj0 . This implies a contradiction that B nfj0g 2 D^(p+e(i)).
If k2  t and k + k1  r + s = jA \ S1j, then k > r and (S1 n A) \ B 6= ;. Take any
i0 2 (S1 n A) \ B. Then we have ak  ar+1  pi0 + pj0 and B n fi0 ; j0g 2 D^(p + e(i)),
leading to a contradiction. Otherwise, we have k2  t and k+ k1 < jA\S1j = r+ s, which
implies k > r and k1 < s. It follows from property (2) that ak  ar+1  bs+pj0  bk1+1+pj0 .
This implies a contradiction that B n fj0g 2 D^(p+ e(i)).
This concludes that the value function u satises the GSC-condition. By Theorem 3.1
of Sun and Yang (2006), the market has an equilibrium. 2
The following example is due to Sun and Yang (2006) and reects a typical and funda-
mental case in the manufacturing industry.
Example 2: Consider a manufacturing industry which consists of nitely many rms,
workers and machines. Let I denote the set of manufacturing rms, S1 = fw1; w2;    ; wKg
the set of workers and S2 = fm1;m2;    ;mLg the set of machines. Firms need not be
identical and can be heterogeneous, so do workers and machines. Every rm can hire as
many workers and buy as many machines as it wishes, under its budget constraint, for
any given salaries and prices. At each moment in time each worker can work for at most
one rm and each machine can be used by at most one rm. When worker wj operates
machine mk in rm i, this yields a revenue to the rm, denoted by ri(j; k). As a modeling
convention, we assume that no machine or worker does harm to any rm if they stay idle.
When rm i 2 I uses a set A of workers and machines, the revenue ui(A) of these workers
and machines to the rm is completely determined by the pairwise combinations of worker
and machine that the members in A can generate, and is given by
ui(A) = maxf0; ri(j1; k1) + ri(j2; k2) +   + ri(jl; kl)g
with the maximum to be taken over all sets f(wj1 ;mk1); (wj2 ;mk2);    ; (wjl ;mkl)g of l
distinct worker-machine pairs in A. In other words, when facing a set A of workers and
machines, every rm i 2 I need to solve an optimal worker-machine assignment problem.
The whole industry, however, faces a larger and more complex problem of whether there
exists a system of competitive salaries and prices through which all workers and machines
can be eciently allocated to the rms. Sun and Yang (2006, Theorem 4.1) prove that
the revenue function ui of each rm i 2 I satises the GSC condition and the industry has
a competitive equilibrium. The double-track auction proposed in the current paper can
actually discover competitive equilibrium prices of workers and machines by which rms
23
can be eciently assigned with their optimal choices of workers and machines.
As mentioned earlier, Hateld et al. (2013), Baldwin and Klemperer (2013), Drexl
(2013), Sun and Yang (2011), and Teytelboym (2013, 2014) have found other important
environments from which the GSC pattern arises naturally. The interested reader can also
refer to Scarf (1960), Shapley (1962), Samuelson (1974), Rassenti et al. (1982) for earlier
venerable studies on complementarity.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1 Because, at any given prices p,
maxANfu0(A) +Ph2NnA phg = maxANfu0(A) Ph2A ph+
+
P
h2A ph +
P
h2NnA phg
= maxANfu0(A) Ph2A phg+Ph2N ph;
clearly we have S(p) = D0(p). 2
Proof of Lemma 2.3 Take any Walrasian equilibrium (p; ) and any allocation .
By denition, we have for any bidder i 2 I
ui((i))  X
h2(i)
ph  ui((i)) 
X
h2(i)
ph
and for the seller
u0((0)) +
X
h2Nn(0)
ph  u0((0)) +
X
h2Nn(0)
ph
Summing up the two inequalities yieldsX
i2I0
ui((i))  X
i2I0
ui((i)):
This shows that  is ecient. 2
Here we give a brief self-contained explanation about the relationship (3:4), i.e.,
max
2
fL(p(t))  L(p(t) + )g = max
2
nX
i2I0

min
S2Di(p(t))
X
h2S
h

  X
h2N
h
o
We sketch how to derive the above relationship from the left to the right. The interested
reader can refer to Sun and Yang (2009) in detail. Write down the Lyapunov function L
as
L(p(t))  L(p(t) + ) = X
i2I0
(V i(p(t))  V i(p(t) + ))  X
h2N
h (5.8)
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Observe that the above formula involves every bidder's valuation of every bundle of
goods, so it involves private information. Apparently, it is impossible for the auctioneer
to know such information unless the bidders tell her. Fortunately, she can fully infer the
dierence between L(p(t)) and L(p(t) + ) just from the reported demands Di(p(t)) and
the price variation . To see this, we know from Sun and Yang (2009) that when prices
move from p(t) to p(t) + , the change in indirect utility for every bidder i is unique and
is given by
V i(p(t))  V i(p(t) + ) = min
S2Di(p(t))
X
h2S
h (5.9)
Consequently, the equation (5.8) becomes the following simple formula whose right side
involves only price variation  and optimal choices at p(t):
L(p(t))  L(p(t) + ) = X
i2I0

min
S2Di(p(t))
X
h2S
h

  X
h2N
h
It follows immediately that
max
2
fL(p(t))  L(p(t) + )g = max
2
nX
i2I0

min
S2Di(p(t))
X
h2S
h

  X
h2N
h
o
:
This completes a brief discussion of the important formula of (3:4).
In the rest we will prove Theorem 3.1. To do so, we rst introduce several notations.
Let p; q 2 IRn be any vectors. With respect to the two given sets S1 and S2, we dene their
generalized meet s = (s1;    ; sn) = p ^g q and join t = (t1;    ; tn) = p _g q by
sk = minfpk; qkg; k 2 S1; sk = maxfpk; qkg; k 2 S2;
tk = maxfpk; qkg; k 2 S1; tk = minfpk; qkg; k 2 S2:
Notice that the two operations are dierent from the standard meet and join operations.
For p; q 2 IRn, we introduce a new order by dening p g q if and only if ph  qh for all
h 2 S1 and ph  qh for all h 2 S2. A function f : IRn ! IR is a generalized submodular
function if f(p ^g q) + f(p _g q)  f(p) + f(q) for all p; q 2 IRn.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 By Theorem 3.1 of Sun and Yang (2006) the market has a
Walrasian equilibrium and by Lemma 1 of Sun and Yang (2009) the Lyapunov function
L() attains its minimum value at any equilibrium price vector and is bounded from below.
Since the prices and value functions take only integer values, the Lyapunov function is an
integer valued function and it lowers by a positive integer value in each round of the IDT
adjustment process. This guarantees that the auction terminates in nitely many rounds,
i.e., (t) = 0 in Step 3 for some t 2 Z+.
Let p(0); p(1);    ; p(t) be the generated nite sequence of price vectors. Let t 2 Z+
be the time when the IDT adjustment process nds (t) = 0 at Step 2. We claim that
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L(p)  L(p(t)) for all p g p(t). Suppose to the contrary that there exists some p g p(t)
such that L(p) < L(p(t)). By the convexity of L() via Theorem 3 (i) of Sun and Yang
(2009), there is a strict convex combination p0 of p and p(t) such that p0 2 p(t) +  and
L(p0) < L(p(t)). From equation (3.4) we know that L(p(t) + (t)) < L(p(t)), and so
(t) 6= 0 in Step 2 of the IDT adjustment process, yielding a contradiction. Therefore, we
have L(p _g p(t))  L(p(t)) for all p 2 IRn, because p _g p(t) g p(t) for all p 2 IRn. We
will further show that L(p _g p(t))  L(p(t)) for all t = t + 1; t + 2;    ; t and p 2 IRn.
By induction, it suces to prove the case of t = t + 1. Notice that p(t + 1) = p(t) + (t),
where (t) 2  is determined in Step 3 of the IDT adjustment process. Assume by way
of contradiction that there is some p 2 IRn such that L(p _g p(t + 1)) < L(p(t + 1)).
Then if we start the IDT adjustment process from p(t + 1), we can by the same previous
argument nd a (6= 0) 2  in Step 2 such that L(p(t+ 1) + ) < L(p(t+ 1)). Since L()
is a generalized submodular function by Theorem 3 (i) of Sun and Yang (2009), we have
L(p(t)_g (p(t+ 1) + )) +L(p(t)^g (p(t+ 1) + ))  L(p(t) +L(p(t+ 1) + ). Recall that
L(p(t)_g (p(t+1)+))  L(p(t)). It follows that L(p(t)^g (p(t+1)+))  L(p(t+1)+) <
L(p(t + 1)). Observe that 0 = 0 ^g ((t) + ) 2  and p(t) ^g (p(t + 1) + ) = p(t) + 0.
This yields L(p(t) + 0) < L(p(t) + (t)) and so 0 6= (t), contradicting the denition of
(t) 2  by which L(p(t) + (t)) = min2 L(p(t) + ).
Next we prove that L(p ^g p(t))  L(p(t)) for all p 2 IRn. To see this, we rst
show that L(p)  L(p(t)) for all p g p(t). Suppose to the contrary that there exists
some p g p(t) such that L(p) < L(p(t)). By the convexity of L() via Theorem 3 (i)
of Sun and Yang (2009), there is a strict convex combination p0 of p and p(t) such that
p0 2 fp(t)g   and L(p0) < L(p(t)). Because of the symmetry between Step 2 and Step
3, Lemma 3 (where  is replaced by  =  ) and Step 3 of the GDDT procedure imply
that L(p(t) + (t)) = min2 L(p(t) + ) = min2 L(p(t) + )  L(p0) < L(p(t))
and so (t) 6= 0, contradicting the fact that the GDDT procedure stops in Step 3 with
(t) = 0. So we have L(p)  L(p(t)) for all p g p(t). Because p^g p(t) g p(t) for all
p 2 IRn, it follows that L(p ^g p(t))  L(p(t)) for all p 2 IRn.
We also proved above that L(p _g p(t))  L(p(t)) for all p 2 IRn. Since L() is
a generalized submodular function by Theorem 3 (i) of Sun and Yang (2009), we have
L(p)+L(p(t))  L(p_g p(t))+L(p^g p(t))  2L(p(t)) for all p 2 IRn. This shows that
L(p(t))  L(p) holds for all p 2 IRn and by Lemma 1 of Sun and Yang (2009), p(t) is an
equilibrium price vector. 2
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